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IDEA 0136-69

Copy 14 of 14

22 April 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Special Activities

SUBJECT : Headquarters Tactical Evaluation Team
Report on SCOPE SAINT II, April 1969

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1. The Headquarters Tactical Evaluation Team [redacted]

accomplished an evaluation of the Headquarters ability to plan, direct and control the deployment of one U-2R from Edwards AFB California, [redacted] and to fly one simulated operational mission.

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2. The Headquarters satisfactorily demonstrated its capability to deploy the subject aircraft and to plan, direct and fly a simulated operational mission. The actions planned and taken prior to the U-2R/ forklift incident were considered adequate and sufficiently demonstrated operational staff capability even though the evaluation was terminated after the incident.

3. There were no major or limiting factors.

4. The following team observations/comments are submitted:

a. The team considered all pre-mission coordination and planning to be much improved over the last SCOPE SAINT deployment. Additionally, appropriate personnel at AFIGOS and Loring Air Force Base should be complimented for their outstanding support.

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b. The initial operations order required clarification with regard to the duties and responsibilities of the [redacted] monitor stations. Recommend that future plans spell out their precise responsibilities with regard to command control inputs or message handling.

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c. Headquarters directives do not provide for support airlift arrival and departure messages. Recommend that Reports Control Manual be amended accordingly.

d. The 900/2 go-no-go terminal weather forecast criteria required last minute change when forecast weather was 500/2. This age-old problem is caused by the disparity between generally pessimistic 24 hours plus forecasts and conservative use of higher published let down minima. For planning purposes recommend that future deployments be based upon published GCA or ILS weather minima provided sufficient fuel is available to proceed to a suitable alternate. As mission count down progresses consideration should include: equipment reliability; pilot proficiency and fatigue - if any; urgency of mission; and the political pros and cons of diverting aircraft to an alternate.

e. At least one SCOPE SAINT II Annex (Annex F) and one [] message were released by other than the IDEALIST Division. Recommend that all Hqs staffs who generate operations Annexes or [] prepare and authenticate messages for final release by the IDEALIST Division.

f. An attempt was made to employ long distance telephone communications with the deployed detachment during a period that all deployed personnel should have been resting. Normal project communications are adequate for most situations. The use of long distance telephone, HF, or other back up communications methods must be restricted to unusual emergency conditions, or when normal communications are inoperative.

g. Future use of the buddy-tactics should be carefully evaluated especially when the planned mission involves an en route stop, take off and rendezvous. The Team's opinion is that mission success rests too heavily upon the guaranteed take off of an en route deployed support aircraft. Last minute support aircraft problems or below take off weather minima could well turn mission into chaos should it become necessary to abort the U-2 for one reason or another. Additionally,

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it is believed that under most conditions it would be advantageous to deploy the support aircraft ahead of the U-2 to the maximum extent possible. In the long run the deployed personnel and equipment will be better prepared to receive and handle the aircraft upon its arrival and immediately commence follow-on mission generation. This would also enable the deployed commander and his key staff to better supervise and manage resources.

h. The Headquarters staff should become and remain more knowledgeable of the unit deployment plans. This is particularly true on those items such as cameras, weather packages, processing equipment, etc., as political or cover conditions might dictate various U-2/support aircraft loading options. The next time this plan is exercised both the Headquarters and the unit may be involved in a crisis situation wherein less than 24 hours is available for coordination.

i. A requirement exists for the Security and Communications staffs to provide appropriate addressing instructions for message traffic when dealing with a second country station, such as

cumbersome and time consuming. Recommend Cover Staff/OSA review these procedures with the intention of providing a mechanism for obtaining more expeditious final approvals.

WILLIAM E. SHELTON
Colonel, USAF
Deputy for Operations, OSA

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Director of Special Activities 24 Apr 69

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OSA/D/OPS [redacted] en(22 April 1969)

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